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Abstract
Scholars trying to understand attitudes toward the European Union (EU) are increas-
ingly interested in citizens’ basic predispositions, such as the “Big Five” person-
ality traits. However, previous research on this particular relationship has failed to 
provide sound hypotheses and lacks consistent evidence. We propose that looking 
at specific facets of the Big Five offers a deeper understanding of the associations 
between personality predispositions, their measures, and EU attitudes. For this pur-
pose, the 60-item Big Five Inventory-2, which explicitly measures Big Five domains 
and facets, was administered in a German population sample. We applied a variant 
of structural equation modeling and found that personality predispositions promot-
ing communal and solidary behavior, cognitive elaboration, and a lower tendency 
to experience negative emotions predicted support for further European integration. 
Greater support of European integration might thus reflect, in part, basic psycho-
logical predispositions that facilitate adapting to the political, social, and cultural 
complexity posed by Europeanization. The study thus contributes to our understand-
ing of deep-rooted patterns in thoughts and feelings that can shape citizens’ EU 
attitudes.
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modeling · Germany
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Introduction
Policy-makers and researchers alike seek to understand why citizens differ so 
profoundly in their attitudes toward the European Union (EU)—not just since 
the recent economic crisis and the so-called refugee crisis. Trying to understand 
support for the EU is vital, because the position on European integration might 
become another super issue besides the ideological left–right axis, thus shaping 
new political conflict lines (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). However, while numer-
ous socio-economic and attitudinal antecedents have been identified to link with 
pro-/anti-EU attitudes (see, e.g., Hobolt and de Vries 2016), very little attention 
has been given to fundamental predispositions, namely citizens’ deep-rooted per-
sonality differences.
The present study aims to contribute to a very recent strand of research that 
addresses antecedents of EU attitudes from a psychological or individual differ-
ence perspective, thus focusing on citizens’ personality predispositions (see, e.g., 
Curtis and Nielsen 2018). Personality traits are usually described as relatively sta-
ble individual differences in behaviors, thoughts, and feelings. These differences 
can also affect individuals’ political preferences. A common argument, which is 
called the cognitive-motivational approach, is that political preferences (or belief 
systems) resonate with citizens’ deep-rooted social–psychological needs and 
interests, i.e., personality (Jost 2017).
Personality trait theories have mostly built on the “Big Five” framework, which 
describes the traits Open-Mindedness (or Openness to Experience), Agreeable-
ness, Conscientiousness, Negative Emotionality (or Neuroticism), and Extraver-
sion as global personality “domains” (see Soto and John 2017; labels in brackets 
by Costa and McCrae 1995). Meanwhile, a considerable body of literature has 
studied how personality traits predict left–right or liberal–conservative orienta-
tions (see Gerber et  al. 2011; Jost 2017), but only recently has scholarly work 
looked at these factors with regard to EU attitudes (e.g., Bakker and de Vreese 
2015; Curtis and Nielsen 2018; Curtis 2016; Nielsen 2016, 2018; Schoen 2007).
There are good reasons to believe that citizens’ level of “default support” for 
the European project resonates with their personality. However, we argue that 
previous research has thus far failed to (1.) provide sound theoretical expecta-
tions, (2.) present consistent empirical evidence, and (3.) overcome certain meth-
odological limitations related to measuring and analyzing personality traits.
In this study, we aim to elaborate on a set of hypotheses and we present novel data 
as well as a framework for analyzing associations with specific personality traits, so-
called facets. In particular, we distinguish between specific personality facets among 
the global Big Five domains (see Costa and McCrae 1995) when looking at associa-
tions with EU attitudes. For this purpose, we investigate European integration atti-
tudes using unique data from a German population sample where the 60-item Big 
Five Inventory-2 (BFI-2; Soto and John 2017; see Danner et al. 2019 for the German 
version) was administered. The article closes by discussing the findings’ contribu-
tion to our understanding of how deep-rooted patterns in thoughts and feelings can 
shape the way citizens approach EU politics.
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Issue 1: previous expectations on the Big Five and EU attitudes
Very few studies have so far investigated associations between the Big Five traits 
and EU-related attitudes (see Table 1). Regarding the dependent variable, apart from 
Curtis (2016) who specifically looks at European identity or Bakker and de Vreese 
(2015) who also consider trust and affect, these studies generally measured attitudes 
on “strengthening” the EU (Boomgaarden et al. 2011), i.e., approval of deepening/
widening of the EU, policy transfer, and extended decision-making competencies. In 
what follows, we thus particularly focus on this dimension (“strengthening”), con-
sidering that different dimensions of EU attitudes are likely to have different predic-
tors (see also Boomgaarden et al. 2011).
As can be seen, there is an apparent lack of consensus regarding the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of associations with the dependent variable (see Table 1, column 
“Hypotheses”). Yet, one might object that the studies mentioned are quite hetero-
geneous in terms of the attitudinal concepts, i.e., EU support, being measured (the 
D.V.), they differ in the measures used to assess the Big Five (the I.V.), the countries 
studied (context), and the control variables employed (confounders). Still, the meas-
ures (standardized scales/items) and cases (apart from Poland, older EU member 
states) bear some similarity. Having said that, when studying basic traits, such as the 
Big Five, one could argue that we can expect universal patterns that transcend the 
specific operationalization used or even the context.
Issue 2: the evidence so far
As can be seen in Table 1, it is also safe to say that there is a lack of consistency in 
empirical results obtained so far (see also Curtis and Nielsen 2018). In sum, studies 
have often faced “unexpected associations between personality traits and EU atti-
tudes” (Bakker and de Vreese 2015, p.37) or, in other words, erratic associations. 
Apart from Open-Mindedness (or Openness), there is basically no agreement in the 
associations between “strengthening” the EU and Big Five traits (see Table 1, col-
umn “Effects”). In summarizing, it seems that the literature on this topic still faces 
lots of preliminary evidence.
A different argument, however, would be that relationships between dispositional 
variables and political preferences are necessarily contingent on the “context” or 
the political discourse individuals are exposed to (see Federico and Malka 2018). 
In particular, this might have to do with the prevailing perception of a country’s EU 
membership or the EU as a political actor as well as how citizens’ EU attitudes are 
aligned with other ideological attitude dimensions.
Issue 3: measuring and analyzing personality traits
A number of methodological concerns can also be raised in relation to research 
on personality and politics. This problem has been stressed by other authors in the 
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personality politics literature, such as Gerber et  al. (2011, p. 280), who note that 
“[…] measurement issues may also explain some of the inconsistencies in findings 
[…].” As will be explained below, the main reasons are three interrelated issues.
First, extensive personality inventories used in psychological assessment, such as 
the famous NEO PI-R (Costa and McCrae 1995), cannot be used for practical rea-
sons.1 As can be seen in Table 1 (column “Measure”), previous works have there-
fore used diverse measures of the Big Five with shorter scales of 10 up to 60 items. 
Using (extremely) short measures, however, naturally comes at the price of lower 
reliability and validity and could entail a misrepresentation of empirical relation-
ships (Bakker and Lelkes 2018; Credé et al. 2012; Gerber et al. 2011).
Second, because of using shorter scales, it follows that the lower-level structure 
of the Big Five domains (i.e., the facet-level traits; see Table 2) has been neglected 
thus far. Inconsistent results might also be explained by the fact that various short-
form Big Five batteries naturally differ in their weight they assign to personality 
facets, which are then covered by the measure (see also Gerber et al. 2011, p. 280; 
Bakker and Lelkes 2018, p. 1312). Donnellan et al. (2006) report that the two most 
frequently used scales, Mini-IPIP and TIPI, emphasize certain facets of the Big Five 
more so than others. However, the two measures show a similar pattern of content 
coverage, i.e., they exhibit similar associations with Big Five facets. Overall, this 
Table 2  Domains and facets of the Big Five personality model (BFI-2 model)
Adapted from Soto and John (2017)
Domain Facet (subdomain) Content description
Open-Mindedness Esthetic sensitivity Interest in/appreciation of forms of art
Intellectual curiosity Interest in/engaging with abstract ideas
Creative imagination To be creative/original
Agreeableness Compassion To be compassionate/caring about others
Respectfulness To be polite to others/conflict-avoidant
Trust To exhibit social trust, also in strangers
Conscientiousness Organization To be organized/orderly
Productiveness To show efficient/persistent behavior
Responsibility To exhibit reliable/responsible behavior
Negative Emotionality Anxiety To feel easily stressed and worried
Depression Tendency to experience negative emotions
Emotional volatility To lack stable/controlled emotions
Extraversion Sociability To enjoy interaction with others
Assertiveness To take control in social interactions
Energy Level To show enthusiastic/approach behavior
1 The NEO Personality Inventory—Revised (NEO PI-R; see Costa and McCrae 1995) is perhaps the 
most widely used instrument in psychological research and clinical practice and covers 30 personality 
facets using 240 items.
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would allow for comparability of broad domain-level associations with the Big Five 
between Mini-IPIP and TIPI, given that (un)reliability has been taken into account.
Moreover, there might be theoretically more sound associations between specific 
facets and EU attitudes (i.e., fidelity). In particular, because of higher fidelity, facet-
level analyses should yield higher predictive power for attitudes or behavioral out-
comes (Paunonen and Ashton 2001). One reason is that facets are less abstract (e.g., 
the trait interpersonal Trust, rather than Agreeableness) and, hence, they operate at a 
similar level of abstraction as policy attitudes. Additionally, if associations with sub-
facets exhibit different magnitude, no association or even opposing signs, the overall 
domain effect is less clear. Gerber et al. (2011, p. 282) therefore recommended that 
“facet-level personality measures may help to address this measurement issue.”
A third problem is imperfect measurement reliability of manifest scale scores 
(i.e., the sum score of items), which generally decreases with the number of items 
used (e.g., Bakker and Lelkes 2018). Short-form measures of the Big Five are there-
fore particularly prone to this problem. As a consequence, observed/manifest var-
iable associations will usually be attenuated by unreliability and the results for a 
standard regression model, for instance, can be very different with and without cor-
rection for measurement errors (e.g., Saris and Revilla 2016). We therefore argue 
that the method of structural equation modeling (SEM) is generally better suited 
than manifest variable analysis, as also discussed below. Note, however, that none of 
the studies reported in Table 1 applied SEM. Therefore, we also compared our sub-
stantive results to other classical modeling strategies in the results section.
In sum, the present study aims to substantiate the extant evidence and tries to 
overcome the limitations mentioned.
Hypotheses
Below, we now provide a brief sketch of the Big Five personality trait domains and 
facets (see Table 2) in order to clarify and put forward explicit hypotheses, stressing 
potential facet associations with attitudes on strengthening the EU or support for 
European integration.
Open-Mindedness describes a “mental tendency” for a “wide versus narrow 
range of perceptual, cognitive, and affective experiences” (Soto and John 2017, p. 
120). It might relate to tolerance of diversity (Nielsen 2016), “broadness of one’s 
own cultural interest,” as well as support for “international involvement” (Schoen 
2007, p. 412), and it should resonate with developing a European identity (Curtis 
2016). Accordingly, we hypothesize that Open-Mindedness should generally have 
a unique positive association with strengthening of the EU. As regards facet-level 
associations of Open-Mindedness, previous research suggested that facets of open-
ness to new ideas, others’ values, or curiosity might matter more for one’s political 
views than experiential aspects, such as aesthetic appreciation or creativity (see Sib-
ley and Duckitt 2010). We hence expect that the former aspects/facets (BFI-2 Intel-
lectual Curiosity and Creative Imagination) are more important for explaining EU 
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attitudes, because higher Open-Mindedness allows individuals to more easily adapt 
to the political, social, and cultural complexity posed by Europeanization.
Agreeableness generally describes the “quality” of interpersonal behavior and 
interaction. We hypothesize that Agreeableness resonates with strengthening of the 
EU, because it facilitates trust in strangers beyond the in-group, it is a basis for insti-
tutional trust (Easton 1975), and it facilitates feelings of sympathy and solidarity 
with people from other EU member states.2 Another aspect of Agreeableness relates 
to the desire to relate and cooperate with others, also labeled Communion (Bakan 
1966). As regards facet associations in the BFI-2, we therefore expect that Trust in 
the benevolent intent of others, concerns about benevolence of others or Compas-
sion might matter more than politeness or Respectfulness aspects (see Hirsh et al. 
2010). Interestingly, however, Bakker and de Vreese (2015) found even a negative 
or no associations between domain-level Agreeableness and EU attitude dimensions.
Conscientiousness can have proactive sides, such as need for achievement and 
commitment, and inhibitive sides. Previous works (see Table 1) basically stress the 
latter aspect, arguing that conscientious people are traditional, reluctant to change, 
favor the status quo, and like order (inhibitive, BFI-2 Organization). Yet, this also 
bears some resemblance to authoritarian attitudes. Following this notion of Consci-
entiousness, one should expect a negative association with a desire for strengthening 
the EU. Schoen (2007, p. 413) further speculates that individuals high in Conscien-
tiousness “may regard international involvement as an appropriate means to pursue a 
goal,” which would relate to aspects of proactive behavior (BFI-2 Productiveness or 
Dutifulness) or overall Agency (see Bakan 1966). Using this very argument, Nielsen 
(2016) postulated a positive correlation with pro-EU attitudes, whereas Schoen 
(2007) finally postulated a negative association. We follow the notion that facets of 
proactive behavior (or Agency) might even positively link with pro-EU attitudes.
Negative Emotionality describes a tendency toward negative emotional experi-
ences. We hypothesize that Negative Emotionality and strengthening of the EU will 
be negatively related, because of the motivation to avoid uncertainty or social com-
plexity entailed by Europeanization (Nielsen 2016) as well as to avoid social isola-
tion in a supra-national community (Curtis 2016). This notion disagrees with Bakker 
and de Vreese (2015), who expect a positive association between Negative Emo-
tionality with deepening/widening of the EU, because the EU could accommodate 
the experienced fear caused by globalization (Europeanization). We postulate that 
tendencies described by BFI-2 Anxiety and Depression are likely to have a negative 
impact, because political, social, and cultural complexity may entail greater distress.
Extraversion is a “social tendency” that describes openness to and the preferred 
quantity of social experiences. However, it is often mistaken for behavioral traits 
attributable to high Open-Mindedness and low Conscientiousness, arguing that more 
extraverted people seek new information, they challenge established beliefs, and 
are more adaptable (see, e.g., Nielsen 2016). Given this ambiguity and the typical 
non-correlation with political orientations (Gerber et al. 2011), we have no strong 
2 In contrast, Curtis (2016) argues that the conflict-avoidant nature of agreeable individuals hampers 
European identification, because it might reinforce proclivities for the in-group.
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expectations about specific Extraversion facets and EU support. However, from 
what has been said so far, individual pro-sociality (Sociability), approach behavior 
(Energy Level), and goal attainment (Assertiveness) could, overall, facilitate a pref-
erence for more international involvement and strengthening of the EU.
Data and analysis
Case
We tested our predictions in the German context. Traditionally, the German elec-
torate shows overwhelming support for EU membership, despite clear criticism by 
supporters of the AfD and, to a minor extent, also by the Left. This majority in favor 
of the EU has even increased since the Brexit referendum in June 2016. For exam-
ple, around the time of the interviews (in May 2017), according to Eurobarometer 
data (EB 87), 23% and 52% of Germans reported that they feel “very” and “fairly” 
attached to the EU (vs. 17% and 46%, respectively, on EU average). Trust in the EU 
increased from a record low in May 2016 (28%) to 37% in Fall 2016 and 44% in 
May 2017.
Regarding the association between EU attitudes and ideological attitudes, it 
can be expected that EU attitudes in Germany strongly blend into the  sociocul-
tural issues dimension, such as positions on immigration or authoritarian attitudes, 
rather than economic issue attitudes (see, e.g., Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). Thus, it 
is more likely that personality predictors of support (strengthening) of the EU also 
resemble those of the former dimension, rather than the latter dimension.
Sample and measures
In order to test our hypotheses, we make use of a unique study conducted in Ger-
many. Respondents were interviewed online (CAWI) by a German commercial 
online access panel (Respondi AG) in December 2016. The sample was a quota 
sample (based on age, gender, and education) according to the German census 2011. 
As a quality indicator, participants who either failed an attention check question or 
answered items in less than 3 s or more than 30 s on average were excluded ex-ante 
(n = 114 in total), which resulted in an initial sample size of n = 1224.
Respondents were asked whether European unification has gone too far (0) or 
should go further (10) (M = 4.7, SD = 3.1), a measure frequently used in social 
and political surveys that fits with the “strengthening” dimension of EU attitudes 
(Boomgaarden et al. 2011). We use it as the dependent variable in our analysis.3
Personality was measured with the 60-item Big Five Inventory-2 (BFI-2). The 
BFI-2 aims to measure the five major personality domains and a hierarchical struc-
ture with three facets within each domain (see Table 2 above; Soto and John 2017). 
3 Note that, ideally, one would have several indicators to also account for measurement errors in the 
dependent variable, which was unfortunately not possible.
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Each facet was measured with four items formulated as short, mostly behavioral 
self-descriptions (e.g., “I am compassionate, have a soft heart”; see Soto and John 
2017 or Danner et  al. 2019 for the full list). To mitigate acquiescence bias two 
items per facet were positively poled and two negatively poled, respectively. Items 
could be answered on a fully labeled 5-point rating scale (1 = disagree completely 
to 5 = agree completely). This represents one of the most detailed measurements 
included in recent population surveys, thus allowing a fully fledged investigation of 
personality facets and EU attitudes.
The following control variables were included in the analyses, because these 
might correlate with EU attitudes and personality self-ratings: age in years; gender 
(male = 1); formal education (“lower secondary education,” “intermediate secondary 
education,” and “upper secondary or higher education”); personal net income using 
the means of income categories (M = € 1593, SD = € 1092); and individual religios-
ity (0 = not at all to 8 = absolutely; M = 2.0, SD = 2.5). In a second modeling step, 
we further control for respondents’ self-placement on a traditional left–right scale 
(0 = left to 10 = right) to ensure that personality effects are not the result of mere 
mediation via differences in ideological core attitudes (see also Curtis and Nielsen 
2018).
Analysis: structural equation modeling
Two problems stand out when trying to analyze specific personality traits (facets). 
Manifest scale scores would include the commonality shared with the global domain 
as well as facet-specific variance (e.g., overall Open-Mindedness and Aesthetic Sen-
sitivity; see McCrae 2015). Hence, these cannot be accurately distinguished. Second, 
manifest scale scores additionally exhibit imperfect reliability (measurement error) 
which, as already mentioned, generally biases correlations with a criterion (i.e., out-
come) measure (Saris and Revilla 2016).
In this study, a so-called bifactor structural equation model (SEM) was employed 
for modeling and analyzing the hierarchical structure of personality domains and 
facets. Bifactor models are very common in intelligence assessment, for instance, 
where general intelligence is distinguished from its facets, such as verbal, spatial, 
mathematical, and analytic abilities. Facets (i.e., the factors loading on facet-specific 
items) thus represent the incremental information beyond the global domain (i.e., 
the factors loading on all items of a domain). These different factors—domains and 
facets—can be distinguished using latent variables in SEM, which allows analyzing 
both at the same time (e.g., Chen et al. 2012). The bifactor SEM used here speci-
fies that global domain factors were correlated, all latent facet variables were uncor-
related, and an orthogonal method factor was included to partial out acquiescence 
bias.4 Note that, because facet and domain variables are uncorrelated in bifactor 
models, we can assess their unique contribution (incremental predictive validity) in 
a regression model (Chen et al. 2012).
4 This restriction was imposed in order to be able to identify the full model.
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Furthermore, when using SEM the structural relationships between variables are 
corrected (disattenuated) for measurement errors. For the final SEM specification, 
attitudes toward European integration were regressed on the facet and domain vari-
ables, the socio-demographic controls and, in a second step, on left–right self-place-
ment (14% of the initial sample had missing values on this variable).5 We hence 
restrict our sample size to respondents with non-missing values in these variables 
(n = 899).
Results
We, first, investigated the overall goodness-of-fit criteria of a bifactor measurement 
model to fit the theoretical structure of the BFI-2. This model showed acceptable fit, 
but suggested that five of the hypothesized facets could not be sufficiently identi-
fied.6 We also ran a 5-factor EFA model to see whether item cross-loadings could 
produce model misfit (See Online Supplemental Materials). After this first step, we 
proceed with a bifactor model excluding one item (i42r) due to high cross-loadings 
and exclude the five facets that were insufficiently identified.
The model fit indices for the bifactor model used were as follows: 
χ2(1602) = 5273.5; p < 0.001; CFI = 0.833; RMSEA [90% CI] = 0.047 [0.045; 
0.048]; SRMR = 0.073. Note, however, that, judging based on commonly used fit 
measures for SEM (e.g., Hu and Bentler 1999), the model fitted the data rather ade-
quately. The more sensitive RMSEA (< 0.06) and SRMR (< 0.08) indices suggested 
that the model was accurately specified, only the CFI is just below standard require-
ments of “sufficient” model fit (< 0.90). However, it is likely that a low CFI is also 
due to weak observed variable correlations and slightly non-normal data. We are 
nevertheless confident that the bifactor models were overall correctly specified and 
proceeded by accepting and interpreting its results.
Table  3 presents the results for the bifactor SEM which regressed support for 
European integration on the latent personality domains and facets, including socio-
demographic covariates (Model 1) and, additionally, left–right self-placement 
(Model 2). The results in Table 3 suggest unique and statistically significant contri-
butions of specific personality facets over and above the global Big Five domains. 
As can be seen, Aesthetic Sensitivity was the facet of Open-Mindedness that had 
a unique and significant impact on support for European integration. In turn, this 
suggests that domain-level Open-Mindedness had little explanatory power beyond 
this specific facet. Furthermore, two of the Agreeableness facets, Compassion and 
Trust, were each positively and significantly associated with supporting European 
integration. In other words, both facets exhibit unique and incremental explanatory 
5 For model specifications and full output of the Mplus software, see the Online Supplemental Materials.
6 Note that the facets Respectfulness (A), Productiveness (C), Responsibility (C), Anxiety (N), and 
Energy Level (E) reflected mainly the variance of single items (see Online Supplemental Materials). In 
other words, the items supposedly measuring these facets do not share a common factor over and above 
the general domain factor and therefore the facet has little incremental validity (see Chen et al. 2012).
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power. Contrary to expectations, Conscientiousness played virtually no role in pre-
dicting people’s EU attitudes. In turn, the overall domain trait Negative Emotion-
ality was negatively and significantly related to support for European integration, 
whereas narrow facets showed no additional contribution over and above the general 
domain. Finally, neither the Extraversion domain nor its facet variables were signifi-
cantly related with support for European integration. Finally, in line with previous 
Table 3  Pro-European integration attitudes regressed on Big Five facets (excluding insufficiently identi-
fied facets), domains, and control variables
Related NEO PI-R facet in parentheses (Costa and McCrae 1995). Entries show yx-standardized coef-
ficients using MLR estimation. Two-tailed significance levels
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p <  0.001. Reference category: Lower secondary education
Personality domains and BFI-2 facets Model 1 Model 2
Standardized effect size S.E. Standardized effect size S.E.
Domain: Open-Mindedness 0.096 0.101 0.118 0.096
O-Aesthetic Sensitivity 0.214*** 0.042 0.160*** 0.044
O-Intellectual Curiosity (Ideas) 0.071 0.068 0.036 0.071
O-Creative Imagination (Fantasy) − 0.085 0.070 − 0.094 0.069
Domain: Agreeableness − 0.012 0.067 − 0.032 0.064
A-Compassion (Altruism) 0.171** 0.055 0.116* 0.055
A-Trust 0.196* 0.086 0.170* 0.084
Domain: Conscientiousness − 0.002 0.069 0.009 0.066
C-Organization (Order) 0.016 0.044 0.024 0.043
Domain: Negative Emotionality − 0.151* 0.065 − 0.144* 0.063
N-Depression − 0.036 0.049 − 0.048 0.047
N-Emotional Volatility − 0.062 0.068 − 0.074 0.063
Domain: Extraversion − 0.058 0.102 − 0.081 0.096
E-Sociability (Gregariousness) − 0.065 0.066 − 0.038 0.063
E-Assertiveness − 0.022 0.050 − 0.021 0.048
Left–right scale − 0.211*** 0.047
Gender (1 = male) 0.088 0.046 0.087* 0.044
Age in years 0.017 0.085 − 0.029 0.084
Intermediate secondary education − 0.017 0.039 − 0.012 0.037
Upper secondary or higher education 0.173** 0.052 0.171** 0.050
Net income in € − 0.010 0.042 0.018 0.042






RMSEA [90% CI] 0.046 [0.044; 0.047] 0.045 [0.044; 0.047]
SRMR 0.069 0.069
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research, a strong impact of higher formal education on positive EU attitudes was 
corroborated.
When including the left–right scale (Model 2), the aforementioned effects 
decreased somewhat, i.e., they were picked up (mediated) by ideological orienta-
tions to some extent, but remained statistically significant. In particular, the results 
clearly showed that respondents who consider themselves as ideologically right-
wing were generally more critical of further European integration.
Supplemental analysis: SEM vs. alternative modeling strategies
We also compared the substantive results to other commonly applied modeling 
strategies (see the Online Supplemental Materials): standard regression analysis 
with manifest sum scores and regression on second-order factors in SEM (see Chen 
et  al. 2012).7 In general, regression analyses on either Big Five domain scores or 
second-order latent factors using SEM were very similar, because the reliability of 
the Big Five domain variables was relatively high (≥ 0.79). Also, all models agree 
that higher Open-Mindedness and higher Agreeableness favor EU support.
According to the alternative models’ results, however, Extraversion was nega-
tively associated with EU support. When running a regression model with mani-
fest facet scores instead, only Aesthetic Sensitivity turned out statistically significant, 
whereas none of the Agreeableness facets seemed relevant. In summarizing, the 
domain-level associations found seem to underestimate and neglect the influence of 
important facet-level associations (hence, potential Type I error), whereas observed/
manifest variable analyses generally suffer from varying bias due to unreliability 
(attenuation) and might neglect incremental predictive power of a personality facet 
(see Westfall and Yarkoni 2016).
Table 4  R2 values for European integration attitudes by model type
SoD socio-demographics, R2 Total variance explained for the dependent variable, ΔR2 increase when 
including the Big Five. See the Online Supplemental Materials for the other models’ details










R2 (SoD only) 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4
R2 (+ personality) 23.9 15.9 16.0 18.8
ΔR2 12.5 4.5 4.6 7.4
R2 (SoD + left–right scale) 20.2 20.2 20.2 20.2
R2 (+ personality) 27.3 22.8 22.8 24.3
ΔR2 7.1 2.6 2.6 4.1
7 Modeling only the facets as first-order latent factors in SEM was not feasible and resulted in estimation 
problems, because the general domain factor is omitted and facets are by definition almost perfectly cor-
related (multicollinearity problem).
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What is more, employing a facet-level analysis and the SEM technique yielded 
relatively high predictive power for the European integration attitudes (see R2 val-
ues in Table 4). More precisely, in comparison with previous studies, this modeling 
strategy substantially exceeded the explained variance on top of other explanatory 
variables (ΔR2; see Tables  1 and 4, respectively). The incremental explanatory 
power was also higher in comparison with the other modeling strategies, namely 




This study set out to investigate personality traits or deep-rooted patterns in thoughts 
and feelings that shape citizens’ attitudes toward EU politics. For this purpose, we 
analyzed a core measure of public opinion: (dis)approval of further European inte-
gration. This single-item measure is most commonly used and conveys a general 
notion of support for the EU, but of course has known limitations. As expected, we 
found associations between EU attitudes and facets of higher Open-Mindedness, fac-
ets of higher Agreeableness, and lower Negative Emotionality, though not with Con-
scientiousness or Extraversion.
The fact that the results resemble those of Big Five facet associations with soci-
ocultural policy attitudes (e.g., immigration; see Aichholzer et  al. 2018) provides 
some indication that, at least in Germany, EU attitudes are somewhat aligned with 
this ideological axis. Our findings by and large also agree with previous studies con-
ducted in Germany (Schoen 2007; Curtis and Nielsen 2018 DE sample; though see 
Extraversion).
In the introduction, we specifically set out to tackle a number of issues identified 
in previous works: elaborate on sound theoretical expectations, add to the existing 
but sparse evidence, and try to overcome methodological limitations by using Big 
Five facet-level analysis and bifactor SEM. We postulated that specific personality 
traits could better explain EU attitudes in terms of the substantive meaning we can 
attach to these associations, on the one hand, and with regard to explanatory power, 
on the other hand. Eventually, a more detailed measurement of Big Five facet-level 
traits in the BFI-2 and employing SEM allowed us to substantiate previous evidence 
and to overcome previous limitations. In particular, we did so by also comparing our 
results to more classical modeling strategies.
The proposed facet-level analysis provided a nuanced picture and revealed that 
more specific associations with citizens’ personality predispositions exist. Individual 
differences in Aesthetic Sensitivity (similar to Openness to Aesthetics), which orig-
inally measures sensitivity to and appreciation for art, mattered most for explain-
ing support for strengthening the EU. This was contrary to our facet-level expecta-
tions. One explanation could be that it is a more “typical” facet of the Openness 
trait. Yet another interpretation is that Aesthetic Sensitivity represents aspects of cog-
nitive elaboration and comfort with complexity (Onraet et  al. 2011, p. 195). This 
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facet might actually link with traits such as the Need for Cognitive Closure (nega-
tive association) or the Need for Cognition, subsumed as “cognitive style.” It could 
thus reflect an important default “epistemic” predisposition related to processing the 
complex political information entailed by Europeanization. These potential relation-
ships thus deserve to be studied further.
The significant and unique effects for Compassion and Trust have to be seen in the 
light of Agreeableness being a domain that describes social and communal behavior. 
Dispositional Trust serves as the basis for trust vis-à-vis strangers (i.e., social trust) 
and could hence foster trust in other EU nationalities. On the other hand, Trust could 
provide a basis for institutional trust, a prerequisite when handing over political sov-
ereignty to EU institutions. The Compassion facet (similar to Altruism) of Agreea-
bleness, in turn, describes a tendency to helpful and unselfish behavior and might 
resonate with concerns over social equality and solidarity with other people from 
other EU countries. This is particularly important in the light of a potential “solidar-
ity crisis” in recent years.
That people high in Negative Emotionality generally seemed to disapprove of 
further deepening or widening of the EU can also be interpreted from a cognitive-
motivational perspective, which postulates that individuals’ political preferences are 
driven by epistemic and existential needs to deal with uncertainty and minimize per-
ceptions of threat (Jost 2017). Increasing sociocultural variety, political uncertainty, 
and perceived lack of control entailed by Europeanization might impose a threat to 
individuals who already exhibit anxious, worrying, and emotionally unstable ten-
dencies. Yet, the role of emotions more generally and emotions toward the EU also 
deserve to be studied further.
Conclusions
It is fair to say that the future of the EU, its legitimacy, and European integration 
depend on citizens’ approval. On a more general level, these and other results tap 
into citizens’ differential threshold for a “default support” for the European project. 
In sum, rejection of further European integration seems to reflect, in part, basic psy-
chological predispositions that facilitate adapting to the political, social, and cultural 
complexity posed by Europeanization. Hence, this study highlights the importance 
of looking at more deep-rooted predispositions that potentially drive other important 
predictors of pro-/anti-EU attitudes, especially so-called identity-driven motivations 
(e.g., Hobolt and de Vries 2016).
Another important question is “what do citizens currently have in mind when 
thinking about European integration?” Traditionally, in many countries, pro-/anti-
EU attitudes were aligned with immigration attitudes, while in other countries 
that were affected most by the Eurozone-wide economic crisis after 2009, they are 
increasingly tied to economic policies (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). Future research 
might thus investigate to what extent personality predictors of EU attitudes resemble 
those of other (left–right) issue positions and whether or not they are actually con-
tingent on the country context. Eventually, there is still much to be learned about the 
differentiation in EU attitudes or dimensionality (Boomgaarden et al. 2011). While 
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we could not address the multi-faceted nature of EU attitudes in more detail (due to 
data limitations), we clearly elaborated on the explanatory variables side. It has yet 
to be studied whether or not personality domains and facets are differently associ-
ated with European identity, for instance.
Finding out which specific personality traits, such as the Big Five facets, mat-
ter the most for EU attitudes is also important for conducting future research. The 
results of this study could provide guidance on relevant moderators, for instance. 
This is particularly relevant when studying the impact of political communication, 
persuasion, and media effects, which might only apply for certain individuals. How-
ever, in lieu of extensive personality inventories, this might require that researchers 
also turn to the “nuances” captured by single items of commonly used personality 
scales (e.g., Mõttus et al. 2019).
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